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Abstract
Some economically developed countries are suffering from an aging society with fewer
children, which has brought about greater burdens imposed by social security. A child
allowance and child-care services are provided by the governments in these countries to raise
fertility. An increase in fertility pulls up the future labor population. An increase in labor
population can subsequently provide sufficient social security benefits in terms of pensions
and other transfers. This paper presents consideration of three child-care policies. The first
is child allowances. The second is a subsidy for child-care services. The third is a subsidy
for child care in the home. These three policies can raise fertility and the future labor
population. This paper presents results of a derivation showing that child allowances can
raise both the demand for child-care services and child care in the home. Therefore, fertility
can always rise. However, a decrease in labor supply time has the effect of reducing the
pension benefit. With large substitution between child-care services and child care in the
home, the subsidy for child-care services or child care in the home can reduce fertility. Then,
the pension benefit can not always increase.
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1 Introduction
Fig. 1 presents social expenditures for child-care policies and fertility. In France and Sweden,
fertility and social expenditures for child-care policies are higher than those of Japan. Therefore,
low fertility in Japan can be raised by sufficient child-care support. However, it is not good that
only cash benefits be given for children. A policy is needed that enables a parent to work and
care for children simultaneously. In France and Sweden, female labor participation is higher
than in Japan.1
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.]
High fertility and high labor participation can maintain the pension system because the
government can collect sufficient revenue to provide social security benefits such as pensions.
In economically developed countries, an aging society is progressing. Providing sufficient social
security benefits in the future is an important problem. Figure 2 presents the replacement rate
of pension benefits for OECD countries.
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.]
If the replacement rate of the pension benefit is high, then the pension benefit for the income
of working generations is large. The replacement rate in Japan is low. Two ways to increase
the pension benefit are readily apparent. One is to increase the contribution rate. The other
is to increase the population size of working generation and aggregate labor supply. However,
the former policy is not good because an aging society is progressing. The burden per capita
increases. Therefore, it is not sustainable. The government should expect to increase fertility
and labor participation with policies to maintain the pension benefit level.
This paper presents consideration of endogenous fertility in a pay-as-you-go pension and
examines whether child-care policies can raise fertility, labor supply, and raise the pension benefit
in the future. Concretely, this paper presents an examination of child-care policies of three types:
child allowance, the subsidy for child-care services and a subsidy for child care in the home.
1The female employment rate from 25 years old to 54 years old in Japan was 69.2% in 2012, which is lower
than that in France or Sweden: 76.0% in France, 82.5% in Sweden (OECD Statistics).
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Many earlier studies have examined child-care policies. The endogenous fertility model was set
by Becker (1960), Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). Zhang (1997), van
Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), van Groezen and Meijdam (2008), Fanti and Gori (2009),
Oshio and Yasuoka (2009) and Yasuoka and Goto (2011) set an endogenous fertility model and
examine whether a child allowance can raise fertility or not. Apps and Rees (2004), Mart´ınez and
Iza (2004) and Day (2012) examine child-care services and describe a positive relation between
fertility and the female labor supply. This result is consistent with those presented in reports by
Ahn and Mita (2002) and Sleebos (2003), who described a positive relation between fertility and
female labor participation in terms of empirical studies. The positive relation is brought about
by child-care services.2 Momota (2000) reports that child-care policies affect the child-care time
or the labor supply. Many earlier studies have been undertaken to examine how a pension policy
affects fertility and the labor supply in an endogenous fertility model (Wigger (1999), Lin and
Tian (2003), Fenge and Meier (2005), and Hirazawa and Yakita (2009)).
The conclusions presented in this paper are the following. This paper adopts the assumption
that fertility is determined by child-care services and child care in the home. The child allowance,
which is provided proportionally to the number of children, increases both child-care services and
child care in the home. Then, fertility can always rise. However, the labor supply time decreases
because of an increase in child care in the home. Therefore, as long as pension benefits to provide
for older people are collected from labor income that younger people gain, the pension benefit
can not always increase. Without a pension system, the subsidy for child-care services increases
the demand for child-care services and decreases child care in the home if high substitution
between child-care services and child care in the home exists. Therefore, this subsidy can not
always raise fertility even if the labor supply increases. With the pension system, this subsidy
can not always raise the demand for child-care services. Finally, a subsidy for child care in the
home raises the incidence of child care in the home if the pension system does not exist. With
high substitution between child-care inputs of two types, the demand for child-care services
2Galor and Weil (1996) set a model in which time is invested in having children. Therefore, a negative
correlation prevails between fertility and the female labor supply. Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) show that child-
care services do not increase fertility and that they decrease child-care time because the price of child-care services
increases, which reduces the use of child-care services.
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decreases. Then, fertility does not always increase. With the pension system, this subsidy for
child care in the home does not always increase child care in the home. Therefore, these child-
care support policies can not always increase the pension benefit: an increase in fertility and a
decrease in labor supply exists or a decrease in fertility and an increase in labor supply exists.
This paper includes the following. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium.
Section 4 examines child-care policy capabilities for raising fertility, the demand for child-care
services, child care in the home, and pension benefits. The final section concludes this paper.
2 The Model
The model economy in this paper is constructed in terms of a two-period (young and old)
overlapping generations model. The economy comprises agents of three types: households, firms
of two types (one produces child care services; the other produces final goods), and a government.
In t period, the population of younger people is Nt; the population of older people is Nt−1. We
explain the agents in the following subsections.
2.1 Households
Individuals in households exist in two periods: a young period and an old period. Younger
people provide labor supply to gain labor income. The labor income is allocated to consumption
in the younger period c1t, the savings st are consumed during the old period c2t+1. Purchasing
child-care services et is done at price zt. The individuals allocate their time to labor time (1− lt)
and child-care time lt. This paper assumes the number of children nt as
nt = (Ae
ρ
t +Bl
ρ
t )
1
ρ ,−∞ < ρ < 1. (1)
Apps and Rees (2004) assume a fertility function as having constant returns to scale for lt and
et. This paper specifies constant elasticity of substitution between child-care services et and
child care time lt.3 With the wage rate as wt, the individuals gain labor income (1− lt)wt. The
government provides pension benefits for older people pt and collects revenues from labor income
3Many earlier researchers specify the fertility function and examine how fertility is determined. Mart´ınez and
Iza (2004) assume a perfectly substituting function between lt and et. Hirazawa and Yakita (2009) assume a
Cobb–Douglas function.
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earned by younger people at the contribution rate τ . In addition, the government provides child-
care policies: The first policy is a child allowance program in which the government provides an
allowance in proportion to the number of children. The second policy is to subsidize child-care
services. The third is to provide a benefit if individuals stop working to care for their children.
The budget constraint in the young period and that in the old period are shown as
st + c1t + (1− γ)ztet = (1− τ)(1− lt)wt + ltwt + qnt − Tt, (2)
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + pt+1. (3)
That is, the household’s lifetime budget constraint is shown as
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
+ (1− γ)ztet = (1− τ)wt − (1− τ − )wtlt + pt+11 + rt+1 − Tt + qtnt, (4)
where 1 + rt+1 denotes the interest rate. The government provides a subsidy for child-care
services at γ rate, child allowances at q and child care in the home at . These policies are
financed by a lump sum tax Tt. The household’s utility function ut is assumed as
ut = α ln c1t + β ln c2t+1 + (1− α− β) lnnt, 0 < α, 0 < β,α+ β < 1. (5)
The households choose the optimal allocation to maximize their utility (5) subject to the function
of quantity of children (1) and the budget constraint (4) as follows.
c1t = α
(
(1− τ)wt + pt+11 + rt+1 − Tt
)
, (6)
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)β
(
(1− τ)wt + pt+11 + rt+1 − Tt
)
, (7)
et =
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)wt − Tt + pt+11+rt+1
)
(1− γ)zt + (1− − τ)wt
(
B(1−γ)zt
A(1−−τ)wt
) 1
1−ρ − q
(
A+B
(
B(1−γ)zt
A(1−−τ)wt
) ρ
1−ρ
) , (8)
lt =
(
B(1− γ)zt
A(1− − τ)wt
) 1
1−ρ
et. (9)
Considering (1) and (9), the fertility function is given as
nt =
(
A+B
(
B(1− γ)zt
A(1− − τ)wt
) ρ
1−ρ
)
et. (10)
Given (8) and (10), fertility can be determined.
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2.2 Firms
This model has two sectors: a final goods sector and an elderly care sector. The production
function in the final goods sector is assumed as the following constant returns to scale function:
Yt = F (Kt, Lt),
∂Yt
∂Kt
> 0,
∂Yt
∂Lt
> 0,
∂2Yt
∂K2t
< 0,
∂2Yt
∂L2t
< 0,
∂Yt
∂Kt∂Lt
> 0. (11)
Therein, Kt and Lt denote the capital stock and labor input. Defining YtLt ≡ f(kt) and kt ≡ KtLt
and assuming a competitive market and a small open economy, an interest rate 1 + rt = f ′(kt)
is fixed by the world interest rate r; k is fixed. The capital stock is fully depreciated within a
period. Then, the wage rate is given as wt = w, where w = f(k)− f ′(k)k.
Next, we consider the child-care sector. Child-care services are produced according to the
following production function.
Y ct = θL
c
t , θ > 0. (12)
The child-care services are produced solely by labor input. This function is assumed by Yasuoka
and Miyake (2010) and Day (2012). In putting labor demand for child-care services Lct into the
child-care sector, the profit pit is given as presented below.
pit = ztθLct − wctLct (13)
The aggregate supply of elderly care services is Xt = θLct . The wage rate w
c
t is given as
wct = θzt. (14)
Considering a homogeneous household and complete labor mobility, the wage in the child-care
sector wct is given as
wct = w (15)
or
zt =
w
θ
= z. (16)
The price of child care zt is constant over time.4
4If the aggregate demand for child-care services is large, then the price of child-care services can not be
determined by zt =
w
θ
because of a shortage of supply for child-care services. However, this model economy does
not consider this case. It is assumed that even if all younger people work in the child-care services sector, the
price of child-care services is given as zt =
w
θ
. Otherwise, the price of child-care services is more than zt =
w
θ
:
zt =
w
θ
is assumed when Lct = (1− lt)Nt.
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2.3 Government
The government in this model economy provides two child-care policies and a pay-as-you-go
pension. First, the government levies taxation on younger people to provide a child allowance
and to subsidize elderly care services and child care in the home. Consideration of a balanced
budget reduces to
Tt = qnt + γzet + wlt, (17)
where 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < 1−τ− < 1. Second, the government provides a pay-as-you-go pension
that the government collects the revenue from younger people at t period and gives benefits to
older people during the same t period. Considering a balanced budget and nt−1 = NtNt−1 , pension
benefit pt is given as
pt = nt−1τ(1− lt)w. (18)
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this model economy is specified by the dynamics of et. Substituting (9) and
(10) into (18), the pension benefit in t+ 1 period is
pt+1 = τwet
(
A+B
(
B(1− γ)z
A(1− − τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
)1− ( B(1− γ)z
A(1− − τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
et+1
 . (19)
Substituting (19) for (8), the following equation is obtained.
τw
1 + r
(
A+B
(
B(1− γ)z
A(1− − τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
)(
B(1− γ)z
A(1− − τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
et+1 =
((1− τ)w − Tt)
et
− C, (20)
where
C =
(1− γ)z + (1− − τ)w
(
B(1−γ)z
A(1−−τ)w
) 1
1−ρ − q
(
A+B
(
B(1−γ)z
A(1−−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
)
1− α− β
− τw
1 + r
(
A+B
(
B(1− γ)z
A(1− − τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
)
.
Equations (17) and (20) give the dynamic path of et. Without child-care policies (Tt = 0), we
obtain the dynamics shown in Fig. 3.
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.]
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As shown in Fig. 3, the steady state equilibrium is given uniquely as et+1 = et = e.
det+1
det
at the
steady state is
det+1
det
= −(1− τ)w
D
1
e2
< 0. (21)
With −1 < det+1det < 0, the steady state equilibrium is locally stable. Child care in the steady
state e is
e =
−C +√C2 + 4D(1− α− β)(1− τ)w
2D
, (22)
where
D =
τw
1 + r
(
A+B
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
)(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
.
4 Policy Effect
In economically developed countries, child-care policies are provided to raise fertility and thereby
raise the future labor supply. This section presents an examination of whether child-care policies
can raise the demand for child care service, child care in the home, fertility and the pension
benefit or not in a steady state. This section presents an examination of three child-care policies.
The first is child allowances, which give an allowance proportionally with the number of children.
The second is a subsidy for child-care services. The third is a subsidy for child care in the home.
First, this paper presents an examination of the effects of child allowances.
4.1 Child allowance
Considering (17), (20), γ = 0,  = 0 and differentiating e by q at the approximation of q = 0,
the sign of dedq is positive, as shown in
de
dq
=
(α+ β)n
(1− α− β)e2
(
D + (1−τ)we
) > 0. (23)
This result is intuitive. Child allowances decrease the child care cost because the government
provides a subsidy according to the number of children. Considering (9), the child-care time in
home l increases because of l =
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) 1
1−ρ e. Therefore, we obtain dldq > 0. Then fertility
increases because both child-care services e and child care in the home l increase. That is, dndq > 0
is obtained. In addition, this paper presents an examination of whether the pension benefit can
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be raised by virtue of child allowances or not. Calculating dpdq , the sign of
dp
dq is ambiguous, as
shown as
dp
dq
=
τwn
e
de
dq
(1− 2l). (24)
With l < 12 , i.e., care for a small child in the home, the child allowance can raise the pension
benefit. Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 Child allowances can always raise child-care services, child care in the home
and fertility in the steady state. The pension benefit can be raised by child allowances if l < 12 .
Child allowances can raise fertility and an increase in fertility raises the revenue for pension
benefits. However, an increase in child care in the home decreases the labor supply. A decrease
in labor supply decreases the revenue for pension benefits. Therefore, child allowances have two
offset effects for pension benefits. With l < 12 , which means a large labor supply time, child
allowances can raise the pension benefit. This proposition is independent of the elasticity of
substitution between child-care services and child care in the home.
4.2 Subsidy for Child-Care Service
This subsection presents an examination of whether a subsidy for child-care services can increase
child-care services, child care in the home, fertility, and the pension benefit or not. Considering
(17), (20), q = 0 and  = 0 and differentiating e by γ at the approximation of γ = 0, the sign of
de
dγ is positive as shown as
de
dγ
=
(α+β)z
1−α−β +
(1−τ)w
(1−ρ)(1−α−β)
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) 1
1−ρ − E
D + (1−τ)w
e2
, (25)
where
E =
τwBρ
(1− ρ)(1 + r)
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
− τw
1 + r
(
ρB
1− ρ
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) 1+ρ
1−ρ
+
1
1− ρ
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
(
A+B
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
))
e.
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This sign is ambiguous. Without a pension system (τ = 0), we obtain dedγ > 0. The effect of the
subsidy for child-care services on child care in the home is
dl
dγ
=
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
(
de
dγ
− e
1− ρ
)
. (26)
The condition to have dldγ > 0 is
de
dγ >
e
1−ρ . Without pension system (τ = 0), the condition to
have dldγ > 0 is ρ < −1−α−βα+β . If the substitution between child-care services and child care in the
home is complementary, then an increase in child-care services raises the demand for child care
in the home. Fertility is increased if ρ < −1−α−βα+β . Otherwise, child care in the home decreases
because of substitution between e and l. Therefore, fertility can not always be raised by the
subsidy for e because of a decrease in l as
dn
dγ
=
n
e
de
dγ
− Bρ
1− ρ
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
. (27)
With dedγ >
e
n
Bρ
1−ρ
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ , the subsidy for child-care services can raise fertility. Without
pension system (τ = 0), the condition to have dndγ > 0 is
de
dγ >
Bρ
1−ρ
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
A+B
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
: even if the
subsidy decreases child care in the home, a large increase in child-care services can raise fertility
as long as dedγ is large.
Next, we examine whether pension benefits can rise because of the subsidy for child-care
services or not. The sign of dpdγ is not ambiguous because we obtain
dp
dγ = τw
(
(1− l)dndγ − n dldγ
)
.
The condition to have dpdγ > 0 is
(1− 2l) de
dγ
>
e
1− ρ
(
Bρ(1− l)
n
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ − l
)
; (28)
that is,
de
dγ
>
<
e
(1− ρ)(1− 2l)
(
Bρ(1− l)
n
(
Bz
A(1− τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ − l
)
if l
<
>
1
2
. (29)
Therefore, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 Without a pension system, the subsidy for child-care services can raise child-
care services. If ρ < −1−α−βα+β , then child care in the home can be raised by the subsidy. Fertility
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increases because of the subsidy if dedγ >
Bρ
1−ρ
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
A+B
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
holds. Considering the pension system,
the subsidy can raise the pension benefit if (29) holds.
This previous description differs from the case of child allowances. Child allowances decrease
the labor supply time (increases child-care time) directly, which decreases the revenues that can
be allocated for pension benefits. However, with a subsidy for child-care services, the labor
supply increases directly if the elasticity of substitution is large. However, a decrease in child
care in the home might reduce fertility. A decrease in fertility has the effect of decreasing pension
benefits: even if the labor supply increases, then the pension benefit might be reduced because
fertility decreases.
4.3 Subsidy for Child-Care in the Home
This subsection presents an examination of whether the subsidy for child care in the home can
increase the use of child-care services, child care in the home, fertility, and pension benefits or
not. Considering (17), (20), q = 0 and γ = 0 and differentiating e by  at the approximation of
 = 0, the sign of ded is positive as shown as
de
d
=
− lwe − ρw(1−ρ)(1−α−β)
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) 1
1−ρ − τwρB(1−ρ)(1−τ)(1+r)
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
D + (1−τ)w
e2
− τw(1−τ)(1−ρ)(1+r)
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) 1
1−ρ
(
A+
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ + ρB
(
Bz
A(1−τ)w
) ρ
1−ρ
) .
(30)
The sign of ded is ambiguous. Without pension system (τ = 0), we obtain
de
d < 0 if ρ > −1−α−βα+β .
Large ρ indicates large substitution between e and l. Therefore, the subsidy for child care in the
home increases the relative price of child-care in services and decreases the demand for child-care
services. The sign of dld is
dl
d
=
l
e
(
de
d
+
e
(1− ρ)(1− τ)
)
. (31)
With ded > − e(1−ρ)(1−τ) , the subsidy for child care in the home increases the incidence child care
in the home. However, if the subsidy greatly decreases the demand for child-care services, then
the child care in the home decreases as well. With ded > 0 by virtue of complementarity, the
child care in the home can always raise the child care in the home. Without a pension system
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(τ = 0), we obtain dld =
z
1−ρ(AwBz )
1
1−ρ+(α+β)w
z(AwBz )
1
1−ρ+w
> 0. Then, the subsidy for child care in the home
increases child care in the home and decreases the labor supply time.
Fertility can not always be raised by the subsidy because
dn
d
=
n
l
dl
d
− l ρA
1− ρ
(
A(1− τ)w
Bz
) ρ
1−ρ
. (32)
If dld >
l2
n
ρA
1−ρ
(
A(1−τ)w
Bz
) ρ
1−ρ , then we obtain dnd > 0. The pension benefit can not always be
raised by the subsidy for child care in the home, as shown in
dp
d
= τw
(
(1− l)dn
d
− ndl
d
)
. (33)
The condition to have dpd > 0 is
1− 2l
l
dl
d
>
(1− l)l
n
ρA
1− ρ
(
A(1− τ)w
Bz
) ρ
1−ρ
; (34)
That is,
dl
d
>
<
(1− l)l2
(1− ρ)(1− 2l)n
ρA
1− ρ
(
A(1− τ)w
Bz
) ρ
1−ρ
if l
<
>
1
2
. (35)
Therefore, the following proposition is established.
Even if the subsidy can increase fertility, an increase in child care in the home reduces the
labor supply time. A decrease in the labor supply time decreases the revenues available to
fund the pension. Therefore, the sign of dpd is ambiguous. Then, the following proposition is
established.
Proposition 3 Without a pension system, the subsidy for child care in the home can raise the
use of child-care services if ρ < −1−α−βα+β . Child care in the home can be raised by the subsidy
if dld =
z
1−ρ(AwBz )
1
1−ρ+(α+β)w
z(AwBz )
1
1−ρ+w
> 0. Fertility increases if dld >
l2
n
ρA
1−ρ
(
A(1−τ)w
Bz
) ρ
1−ρ . Considering the
pension system, the subsidy can raise the pension benefit if (35) holds.
An increase in l brought about by the subsidy for child care in the home might not be worse
than other two child-care policies. With the large substitution between child-care services and
child care in the home, the subsidy for child care in the home reduces the use of child-care
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services. Even if child care in the home increases, fertility might decrease because of a decrease
in child-care services. Then, both fertility and the labor supply decrease and the pension benefit
decreases.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents consideration of endogenous fertility in pay-as-you-go pensions and examines
whether child-care policies can raise fertility and labor supply and can raise pension benefits or
not. To the extent that the pension benefit is provided by revenues from taxes levied on labor
income at the contribution rate, then the pension benefit depends not only on fertility (the
intergenerational population ratio), but also on the labor supply. If fertility is determined by
both child-care services and child-care time by parents, then child-care support policies such as
a child allowance and a subsidy for child-care services or child care in the home can raise fertility
because of an increase in demand for child-care services or child care in the home. However, if
the labor supply decreases, then the pension benefit decreases.
This paper presents results of a derivation showing that child allowances can raise both the
demand for child-care services and child care in the home. Therefore, fertility can always rise.
However, a decrease in the labor supply time has the effect of reducing the pension benefit. A
subsidy for child-care services does not always increase fertility. Even if this subsidy increases
the demand for child-care services, child care in the home decreases in high substitution between
child-care services and child care in the home. Therefore, even if this subsidy can increase the
labor supply, the pension benefit does not increase because fertility does not always increase.
The subsidy for child care in the home can not always increase fertility because a decrease in
child-care services is expected to occur. Therefore, this subsidy might reduce not only fertility,
but also the labor supply. Consequently, the pension benefit decreases.
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Fig. 1: Fertility (below the country) and Fiscal Support for Family (share of Gross Domes-
tic Product) (Data: OECD Social Expenditure Database (November 2008), A 2012 Declining
Birthrate White Paper (2012), Demographic Yearbook (UN) and Vital Statistics in Japan (Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare (in Japan).) Data of Fiscal Support for Families are those
of 2007. Fiscal Support for Family includes benefits in kind (day-care/home help and other
benefits in kind) and cash benefits (family allowance, maternity and parental leave and other
cash benefit). Data of the Total Fertility Rate are those of 2010.)
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Fig. 2: Gross Replacement Rate of Pension (Data: OECD Statistic Pension at a Glance
2011. Gross Replacement Rate of Pension in Fig. 2 shows the pension that a person earns from
an average wage income.)
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